

(218). In other words, Ricoeur is proposing a well-needed complement to the institutional design trend that has invaded contemporary political philosophy. Contrary to many, he stands before the most perplexing issue of recognition with eyes wide open: indeed, demands of recognition may never end and take the form of an “unhappy consciousness” (218). One can try to resolve this potential inflation of claims by sorting out political and substantive issues. But a solution that takes only this path could create vast areas of frustration that canny elites have learned to fuel, or come to neglect recognition claims on the grounds that they hide a Pandora’s box waiting to be opened. I suspect that this neglect mechanism is one of the reasons why so many legitimate recognition claims still languish in limbo as we speak. The course taken by Ricoeur may be difficult to square with the mainstream approach in contemporary political philosophy—political liberalism, to name it—but it nonetheless deserves careful attention.

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Selinger, Evan, and Crease, Robert, eds. *The Philosophy of Expertise*.  
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Problems concerning expertise are as old as Plato and never more urgent than today, where specializations are nested within specializations, and there is an uneasy dependence of democracy on expert counsel. In this context there is theoretical work of practical consequence to be done, and being done, from epistemology to ethics to political philosophy to legal theory to sociology. Thus, the subject of expertise affords philosophers, historians, sociologists, and scientists an important opportunity for constructive conversation.

The essays collected in Evan Selinger and Robert Crease’s fine new anthology, *The Philosophy of Expertise*, suggest that hope for such constructive conversation is not misplaced. Selinger and Crease have gathered an impressive set of fifteen papers, among the richest, most rewarding written to date, organized loosely into three parts corresponding to three axes of analyzing expertise. Part 1 is dedicated to exploring expert-novice relations, part 2 to the constitutive character of expertise, and part 3 to examining expertise critically from nonexperts’ perspectives. This partition proves a somewhat imperfect fit, however. John Hardwig’s essay defending the rationality of epistemic dependence scarcely “contests” expertise and seems better suited for part 1 than part 3; Peter Singer’s argument on the possibility of moral expertise seems better placed in part 2, exploring the character of expertise, than in part 1. These are minor points, though, overshadowed by the quality of the essays themselves.

Alvin Goldman and Scott Brewer tackle the following intriguing problems: How should third parties adjudicate conflicting expert testimonies? Must one be an expert to justifiably decide whom to believe? If so, judges and juries will be paralyzed by conflicting testimony of expert witnesses; widespread public agnosticism on much scientific knowledge will be required whenever lone dissenting experts exist. Yet, short of developing the skills to evaluate expert tes-

timony on its evidential merits, the novice has few tools for evaluation. Brewer is pessimistic: focusing on the courtroom, he doubts that jurors can be expected to have the epistemic competencies presumed of them by the current legal structures governing expert testimony. While jurors might use indirect indicators of trustworthiness, Brewer worries these may be insufficient to underwrite warranted belief in one expert over another. Few expert witnesses are intellectually clumsy enough to display outright contradiction or severe cognitive incoherence, and expert demeanor becomes a suspect guide to trustworthiness when there is a “market” for convincing demeanor, as in legal settings. Goldman seems more optimistic, though acknowledging with Brewer the limitations of indirect guides. Goldman’s most impressive contribution is his analysis of how novices might justifiably respond when more experts believe one opinion than another. Should the numbers matter? Goldman’s answer is qualified: greater numbers should not lend more credence to a position unless one reasonably believes its individual adherents have come to their beliefs via somewhat independent processes. The appropriate weight is a function of the numbers of experts on each side and their relative epistemic independence as gauged by the listener. After all, the fact that a guru’s followers parrot her claims gives her claims no greater credence if those followers would testify to anything the guru says. Were one to discover that all climatologists believe in global warming entirely on the basis of a single scientist’s research, while global warming skeptics believe on mutually independent grounds, the novice bystander ought not to be swayed by the numbers favoring global warming. (Interested readers should see David Coady’s careful criticism of Goldman, “When Experts Disagree,” forthcoming in *Episteme*, in which Coady argues that the metaexpertise of an expert’s followers can sometimes convey evidential support for a claim even if the independence requirement is not satisfied.)

Harry Collins and Robert Evans’s contribution is a gem, a fascinating attempt to push science studies to recognize expertise without renouncing its egalitarian roots. While challenging traditional structures of cognitive authority continues to be profitable, they argue, science studies is due for a “third wave” concerning expertise and experience. Expertise is not evenly distributed among the population, but neither are the socially recognized experts the only real ones—there are, rather, pockets of overlooked expertise. Thus, discursive interaction between recognized and neglected experts is advocated not because of political equality but as dialogue among experts. The paper is provisional, its authors quiet about just what constitutes expertise, but it presents an intriguing call to science studies and a unique chance for engagement with philosophers.

Stephen Turner answers a political challenge posed by Habermas, Foucault, and Fish, namely, does acknowledging expertise undermine liberal commitments to political equality and state ideological neutrality? Can the values of equality and neutrality be maintained when the state privileges some opinions? Turner’s attempt to solve the puzzle is to characterize precisely different types of experts and their appropriate cognitive authorities. The first three types are those whose expertise is legitimated by more-or-less universal public acceptance (example: physicists), those whose expertise is legitimated by and for a preselected audience (theologians), and those who create their own audiences (massage therapists). These types of experts need not undermine liberal democracy, Turner concludes.

More worrisome are experts funded by private backers who leverage their cognitive authority to push the public or public officials toward particular actions: these experts threaten liberal commitments because their backers and audiences diverge.

Turner's taxonomy of experts is intriguing, and he is right to insist that "the public" is not simply passive toward scientific claims and epistemic deference to experts is not equivalent to granting *carte blanche*. (Here his account dovetails nicely with Hardwig's.) But not everyone is sanguine about experts. Paul Feyerabend and Steve Fuller remind us that public deference to science as expert knowledge is rarely as well informed as Turner suggests. Fuller's contribution warns that when expert communities retain exclusive authority in credentialing their members, outsiders cannot challenge the cognitive authority of the expert community and cannot evaluate individual experts beyond the expert community's recommendations. If Fuller is right, even their track records are unreliable indicators of expert abilities, since savvy experts rarely put themselves in position to be truly tested.

In his brief essay inquiring why there shouldn't be science critics like art and film critics, Don Ihde, like Fuller, notes that scientific communities retain exclusive evaluative authority over their members. As an outsider inside the scientific process, Ihde's science critic would go some way toward opening up expert evaluation, for good or ill. Yet, note how far short this falls of the universal legitimization of Turner's first-type expert, whom he takes scientists to exemplify. Note also the gatekeeping power Ihde's plan bestows on science critics, thus raising concerns about legitimizing their cognitive authority.

Feyerabend's contribution is his infamous essay, "How to Defend Society from Science," an appropriate choice, though the neglected "Experts in a Free Society" (in his *Knowledge, Science, and Relativism: 1960–1980* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999]) would have been even better. Feyerabend's anarchist posture recognizes no constraints on science, its methods, or its participants, and no distinction among science, nonscience, and nonsense. "Experts in a Free Society" reveals an author worried not about expertise itself but about the insular specialists unchallenged as experts of their fields. Specialist-experts don't really have expertise, he claims: their focused training and insulation from criticism preclude the intellectual creativity it requires. A self-styled disciple of Mill's *On Liberty*, Feyerabend warns against calcification of scientific knowledge into unreflective ideology. In a nice touch, the editors have included the seemingly superfluous preface to "How to Defend Society from Science" (excised in Ian Hacking's canonical *Scientific Revolutions* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981]), detailing the author's pecuniary reasons for writing the piece and so complicating the point of the essay.

The editors demonstrate an involved, nimble presence throughout. Criticisms of expertise from Fuller and Feyerabend are quietly challenged in editors' remarks consistent with Selinger's previous objections (Evan M. Selinger, "Feyerabend's Democratic Critique of Expertise" and "Expertise and Public Ignorance," *Critical Review* 15, nos. 3–4 [2003]: 359–73, 375–85) to them. It is suggested, for example, that Feyerabend overreaches by assuming that nonexperts have a uniform capacity to challenge experts, which as a disparate lot they cannot all be expected to possess. While not without merit, this objection neglects the

fact that Feyerabend criticizes experts as specialists, as an insulated group whose opinions grow stale if unchallenged. In hyper-Millian fashion, Feyerabend assumes not that individuals alone can challenge specialist-experts but that they can do so collectively through sheer variety of criticism.

Selinger and Crease contribute an analysis of Hubert Dreyfus on expertise, drawing out the phenomenological character and normative implications of his work, displayed in Dreyfus's contribution here articulating how distance learning may fall short of education. Emphasizing education as skill development, not mere transmission of facts, and detailing how education requires face-to-face interactions of students, teachers, and peers, Dreyfus takes as his paradigm case apprenticeship, something he worries that distance learning cannot capture. For their part, Selinger and Crease identify where Dreyfus's account is overly broad or underdeveloped: for example, in failing to appreciate how knowers' specific social locations of gender, race, and age affect skill development, or how novices are supposed to identify expertise.

With John Mix, Selinger contributes a judicious commentary on Collins's notion of interactional expertise (an intermediate position between novice and full contributory expertise), which Collins hypothesizes that sociologists, activists, and others interacting with scientists possess. Interactional experts can successfully speak a field's language but lack its tacit knowledge; for example, interactional experts can talk competently about the TEA laser but cannot operate it. Contributory experts, by contrast, talk the talk and walk the walk. Without dismissing the proposal, Selinger and Mix suggest that Collins overemphasizes the importance of linguistic skill. After all, some contributory experts cannot describe their actions very well, and some nonscientist activists do make original contributions. (Collins's main essay on interactional expertise, "Interactional Expertise as a Third Kind of Knowledge," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 3, no. 2 [2004]: 125–43, is not in the anthology, which will leave some readers wanting. The broad strokes, however, are sketched in the aforementioned essay with Evans.)

Readers of this journal might like greater attention to ethics and expertise than is explored in this anthology. Along these lines, Hardwig on the ethics of expertise ("Toward an Ethics of Expertise," in *Professional Ethics and Social Responsibility*, ed. Daniel Wueste [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994]) or Heather Douglas on scientists' moral responsibilities ("The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 40, no. 1 [2004]: 59–68) would nicely supplement the included essays. As composed, the collection should still interest those who study the role of expertise in moral philosophy. Singer's brief paper is included, as well as Julia Annas's "Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge," which proves a particularly inspired selection. Like Dreyfus, Annas emphasizes expertise as embodied skill, in Annas's case in defending Plato's moral epistemology against the skeptical challenges of modern commentators. In understanding moral knowledge as practical expertise and recognizing virtues as skills, Annas observes, one comes to see that moral skepticism is not of principal concern. Instead, ancient Greek moral knowledge is a matter of problem solving, just as plumbers' expertise is essentially a matter of problem solving. (The plumber is a popular model for expertise, used here by Annas and elsewhere by Collins to characterize scientists as successful practitioners of crafts.)

Unexpected and initially intriguing essays by Edward Said on specialization in literary criticism and Hélène Mialet on how bodies figure into narratives of scientific invention never quite justify inclusion here. These essays are rewarding in their own right, but as contributions to this landmark anthology, the space could be better dedicated to analyses of expertise otherwise neglected, particularly concerning intersections of expertise with gender, race, class, and nationality. Collins and Evans touch on socially underappreciated, neglected expertise; feminist theorists are particularly insightful here. How have those in authority historically appropriated the knowledge of women, poor people, people of color, and colonized peoples? Might standpoint theorists join in dialogue with other philosophers and science studies scholars by conceptualizing standpoints as loci of neglected expertise? Recent work by Linda Martin Alcoff (“On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?” in *Engendering Rationalities*, ed. Nancy Tuana and Sandra Morgan [Albany: SUNY Press, 2001]), Gayatri Spivak (“Can the Subaltern Speak?” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988]), and others would complement and unsettle in interesting ways the essays collected here.

It is because Selinger and Crease have constructed such a first-rate collection of essays that I register this regret, as their anthology will justifiably become the reference of choice for those interested in expertise. Readers across disciplines and specializations are sure to come away enlivened by the problems discussed here and the arguments marshaled in their articulation.

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Shapiro, Ian. *The Moral Foundations of Politics*.  
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Shapiro’s book begins with a striking example, the case of Adolph Eichmann being kidnapped from Argentina by Israeli agents. Shapiro uses this case to pose a fundamental question: “When do governments merit our allegiance and when should they be denied it?” (1). The nation that did the kidnapping did not exist when the crimes were committed. The sovereign nation in which the kidnapping occurred had nothing to do with the crime. What principles do we bring to bear to deal with such questions?

The book is organized around some basic approaches to political theory—utilitarianism, the efforts to synthesize rights and utility, Marxism, social contract arguments supporting theories of justice and, finally, democratic theory. The writing is lucid and likely to be helpful in the sort of undergraduate course that partly gave birth to this text (according to the introduction). However, none of the theories discussed is actually brought to bear on the striking example with which the book starts. All the theories discussed but one are subjected to sustained critique. And the one left standing by the end of the book, democracy, requires